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Fix shenv clobbering forwarded SSH socket with local agent in tmux

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ssh/rc env changes (including SSH_REMOTE_AUTH_SOCK) are lost because
ssh/rc runs as a sshd child process, not the user's shell. The shell
always receives SSH_AUTH_SOCK set to the raw forwarded socket path.

Fresh SSH login worked fine (step 1 catches the raw socket). The bug
was in tmux new windows: SSH_AUTH_SOCK there is our stable symlink, so
step 1 fails, then steps 2/3 look up the system agent and overwrite the
symlink that ssh/rc just set to the forwarded socket.

Fix: only run the system agent lookup when the stable symlink is already
broken. A valid symlink means ssh/rc (or a previous shenv run) already
set it correctly; don't clobber it.

https://claude.ai/code/session_01RhXaFzxJA5D2BcGcz18ipA
This commit is contained in:
Claude
2026-04-19 01:47:36 +00:00
parent 6b50be84a9
commit c5e1157f47
1 changed files with 10 additions and 10 deletions
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20
dotfiles/shenv
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@@ -113,17 +113,17 @@ _is_link_path() {
_CANDIDATE="" _CANDIDATE=""
# 1. Highest priority: ssh/rc sets SSH_REMOTE_AUTH_SOCK to the raw forwarded socket before # 1. If current environment has a valid socket that is NOT our link, it's a prime candidate
# rewriting SSH_AUTH_SOCK to the stable symlink, so it survives the rewrite. # (e.g. fresh SSH login: sshd sets SSH_AUTH_SOCK to the raw forwarded socket before ssh/rc
if [ -S "${SSH_REMOTE_AUTH_SOCK:-}" ] && ! _is_link_path "${SSH_REMOTE_AUTH_SOCK}"; then # rewrites it to the stable symlink; the shell inherits the original raw path).
_CANDIDATE="${SSH_REMOTE_AUTH_SOCK}" if [ -S "${SSH_AUTH_SOCK:-}" ] && ! _is_link_path "${SSH_AUTH_SOCK}"; then
# If current environment has a valid socket that is NOT our link, it's a prime candidate (e.g. SSH forwarding).
elif [ -S "${SSH_AUTH_SOCK:-}" ] && ! _is_link_path "${SSH_AUTH_SOCK}"; then
_CANDIDATE="${SSH_AUTH_SOCK}" _CANDIDATE="${SSH_AUTH_SOCK}"
fi fi
# 2. If no candidate yet, or we're currently using the link, try to find the "real" system agent. # 2. Only look for a system agent if the stable link is already broken. If the link is
if [ -z "${_CANDIDATE}" ] || _is_link_path "${SSH_AUTH_SOCK:-}"; then # valid (e.g. a tmux pane where SSH_AUTH_SOCK points to our symlink which ssh/rc just
# updated to the forwarded socket), leave it alone — don't clobber it with a local agent.
if [ -z "${_CANDIDATE}" ] && [ ! -S "${_SSH_AUTH_LINK}" ]; then
_FOUND="" _FOUND=""
if [ "$(uname)" = "Darwin" ]; then if [ "$(uname)" = "Darwin" ]; then
_FOUND=$(launchctl getenv SSH_AUTH_SOCK 2>/dev/null) _FOUND=$(launchctl getenv SSH_AUTH_SOCK 2>/dev/null)
@@ -147,8 +147,8 @@ if [ -z "${_CANDIDATE}" ] || _is_link_path "${SSH_AUTH_SOCK:-}"; then
fi fi
fi fi
# 3. Last resort: search common paths if we still don't have a valid candidate. # 3. Last resort: search common paths if we still don't have a candidate and the link is broken.
if [ ! -S "${_CANDIDATE}" ]; then if [ ! -S "${_CANDIDATE}" ] && [ ! -S "${_SSH_AUTH_LINK}" ]; then
_U=$(id -u) _U=$(id -u)
for _p in "/run/user/${_U}/keyring/ssh" "/run/user/${_U}/ssh-agent.socket" "/run/user/${_U}/openssh_agent" "/run/user/${_U}/gnupg/S.gpg-agent.ssh"; do for _p in "/run/user/${_U}/keyring/ssh" "/run/user/${_U}/ssh-agent.socket" "/run/user/${_U}/openssh_agent" "/run/user/${_U}/gnupg/S.gpg-agent.ssh"; do
if [ -S "${_p}" ] && ! _is_link_path "${_p}"; then if [ -S "${_p}" ] && ! _is_link_path "${_p}"; then